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LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
JONATHAN R. MACEY*
There are a large number of "law-ands" ·around: law and
philosophy, law and history, law and sociology, law and society,
law and critical race theory. A partial explanation for the
development of these "law-ands" is that contemplating the law by
itself is pretty boring. Just as the International House of
Pancakes would probably not long survive in the competitive
marketplace if it just served plain, unadulterated pancakes with
no syrup or other condiments, the profession of teaching law
would probably (without serious salary acljustments) fail to
attract bright, ambitious people if it offered only a life ofwriting
comprehensive but unimaginative treatises and trying to
describe legal rules to a bunch ofstudents in daily lectures.
Luckily, however, teaching law involves more than articulating
and relaying a set of rules to a passive audience. Those ofus who
do it indulge our interest in issues such as where the rules come
from, what distributive effects the rules have, whether the
current rules are doing what they are supposed to be doing, and
how different rules would alter the way people behave in various
circumstances. In order to examine these issues critically, legal
academics must tUJ;n to disciplines outside of the law itself. For
instance, to study the distributive impact oflega! rules, we might
tum to economics; to describe the effects of legal rules on race
relations, we might tum to critical race theory or to sociology.
Despite the fact that all "law-ands" derive from the natural
desire of legal academics to analyze and understand-rather
than simply to be aware of-the rules, I want to argue that not
all "law-ands" are equal. In doing so, however, I want to
challenge the hierarchical distinction betw'een interdisciplinary
approaches made earlier by Bob Ellickson,I which regards law
* J. DuPrattWhite Professor ofIaw, Cornell Law School.
1. See Roben C. Ellickson. The Market for "Law-And" ScJwlarship. 21 HARv. J.L. Be PUB.
POL'Y157.
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and economics as qualitatively different and better than all the
others because of its singularly pervasive credibility.
Distinguishing between the various "law-ands" on the basis of
their relative durability and appeal is not the best way to go
about the task because the differences between many of these
interdisciplinary approaches-namely those that incorporate
.social science methodologies-are quite superficial.2
A better approach to distinguishing among the various "law-
ands" delineates between those that utilize social science
methodology and those that do not. Law and economics is the
most widespread' and unitary of the interdisciplinary
approaches to law that invoke social science methodology, but it
may not be the most important4 or interesting. Other
approaches include law and statistics (which may be the most
important), law and psychology, law and positive political theory,
and, ofcourse, law and sociology.
What distinguishes these law and social science approaches
from other approaches that rely, for instance, on feminism,
critical race theory, or critical legal studies? The most important
and fundamental distinction is that the law and social sciences
seek to develop testable hypotheses, assertions about the law that
are empirically refutable. In short, these approaches are unique
in not assuming their own conclusions. In this way, the law and
social science approaches maintain a certain amount of
humility. Their proponents admit quite explicitly that, if one
examines their methodologies, their theories can be proved
wrong.
Another distinction between the law and social science
approaches and the other "law-ands" is their neutrality. Law and
the social sciences provide consequential analys~s. Practitioners
in these disciplines ask: "IfX happens, what will be the result of
having a particular law, abolishing a particular law, or amending
2. See. e.g., JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAw: CASES AND
MATERIALS 34 (3d ed. 1994) ("It is important not to take distinctions among the social
sciences too seriously, for the degree of overlap among them is great.... Often,
distinctions among the social sciences are purely arbitrary ••••").
3. See. e.g.. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LA\mR: FAIUNG IDEALS OF THE LECAL
PROFESSION 166 (1993) (observing that "[l]aw and economics is today a pennancnt,
institutionalized feature ofAmerican legal education" and a movement with "dominant,"
ifnot "unrivaled," influence in many fields ortega! scholarship).
4. But see id.
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a particular law? What will be the allocational consequences, for
example?" All interdisciplinary approaches to the law are, or
course, susceptible to corruption and the insinuation of
personal values.5 The scientific method inherent in law and the
social sciences offers a way of attempting to transcend mere
personal values by producing empirically testable hypotheses
that personal values can neither prove nor conceal. I want to
emphasize that I am not arguing that the law and social science
approaches always succeed in producing testable hypotheses
with which we can transcend simple personal values; instead, I
am arguing that doing so is the unique objective of these
approaches. This objective provides an indispensable criterion
by which we can distinguish good and bad analyses of the law.
The final distinction between law and social sciences and
other interdisciplinary approaches is that law and social sciences
are qualitatively better at achieving any particular set of aims
that one might have within the law. Regardless of what one is
trying to accomplish with legal rules, the social sciences provide
a superior framework simply because, done well, they
communicate to people who are nonbelievers.6 An audience is
more likely to be persuaded by an assertion that it is free but
ultimately unable to disprove empirically than by an assertion
that it can reject out-of-hand as founded on unacceptable
personal values.
The greater persuasiveness of objectively disprovable
assertions is intuitively obvious. Suppose that you are a defense
lawyer in South Carolina and that you have a black client on
death row. Naturally, you would want to avert your client's
execution. To do so, you are likely to attempt to challenge the
legality of the white prosecutor's decision to seek the death
penalty for your client.
Are you going to call Derrick Bell or perhaps someone else
from the critical race theory movement in order to save your
5. See, e.g.,Jack M.Balkin, Too Good to Be T11le: The Positive Economic Theory ofLaw, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 1447, 1448-59 (1987) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES 8e RICHARD A.
POSNER, 'nIE ECONOMIC STRUCFURE OF TORT LAW (1987» (arguing that the authors'
ostensibly descriptive economic thesis incorporatesvalue-laden assumptions).
6. See, e.g., NOREEN L. CHANNELS, SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODS IN THE LEGAL ~ROCESS 13
(1985) (suggesting that the singular persuasiveness ofsocial science is not lost on courts,
which cite social science U to add legitimacy to [their] decision[s] and to enhance the
image ofthe decision makers").
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client from the electric chair? I think most defense attorneys
would rather call upon my colleague at Cornell, Ted Eisenberg,
requesting a statistical comparison of the prosecutor's decisions
to seek the death penalty in cases with white defendants and in
cases with black defendants.7 This is simply a crude example of
the point that Bob Ellickson8 has made about using market tests
to sort out the various interdisciplinary approaches to the law. As
the defense attorney in this case, most of us would rely on the
empirical mode of argument that we know is generally most
persuasive. '
Similarly, ifyou want to criticize the current state offamily law
as insufficiently protective of the reproductive or economic
rights of women, the social sciences would probably provide a
more useful platform. than feminist philosophy. Radical
feminists may argue that treating women as bearers and mothers
of children merely perpetuates the subjugation of women by
men, but of what value is this argument to you as an advocate
confronting an audience that does not agree? You can develop a
similar criticism of family law using economics. Take, for
example, lloyd Cohen's article in the Journal of Legal Studies,
using an economic approach to reach a result pexfectly
consistent with feminist perspectives on marriage and on the
exploitation ofwomen in the marital context.9 Nonbelievers can
find this empirically testable argument credible because it is
more than simply conclusory. .
There is another way in which law and social sciences tend to
be more persuasive than other interdisciplinary approaches. The
social sciences require that a theory be precisely focused,
thereby ensuring its relevance to those lines of inquiry to which
7. For a recent example of Professor Eisenberg's statistical analysis of other factors
that may influence the imposition of the death penalty, see Theodore Eisenberg et al.,
Jury Responsibility in CapitalSentencing: AnEmpiricalStudy, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 339, 341 (1996)
(finding that most jurors on capital sentencing panels accept the responsibility that
inheres in their role in imposing the death sentence but nevertheless doubt that most
convicts who receive a capital sentence will be executed).
8. SeeEllickson, supra note 1.
9. See Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; Or, "1 Gave Him the Best Year.r oj
My Lift", 16J. LEGAL STuD. 267, 268 (1987) (observing that the present value ofa wife's
human capital contribution to a marriage declines faster and earlier than that of a
husband's, arguing that this disparate rate of decline induces the husband to seek
divorce, and examining various possible legal innovations that might ameliorate this
result).
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the' theory by its own. terms applies. Theories in law and the
social sciences are, in other words, more resistant to haphazardly
overbroad applications and the loss of credibility that
accompanies them. This is because particular facts-rather than
vague generalizations-:will validate or disprove these theories;
theorists in law and social sciences thus have real incentives to
tailor their assertions to those facts that the theorists believe will
actually bear out their analyses.
Interdisciplinary approaches to the law that do not rely on
social sciences do not benefit from this self-discipline. Consider
critical race theory's arguments on the merit system. Critical
race scholars like Richard Delgado argue explicitly for quotas in
law school faculty hiring.10 Is there any basis for attacking law
school hiring practices, however, or are these arguments
misdirected efforts that may well undermine the movement's
arguments in more relevant areas? There may be empirically
verifiable examples of racially biased hiring practices among
some law school faculties somewhere. but data from the annual
reports of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS)
belie the assumption that minority applicants are less likely than
white applicants to secure a job teaching law. From 1991 to
1994, between one-fifth and one-fourth of newly hired law
teachers were minorities. l1 Moreover, minority applicants who
had themselves listed in the AALS Faculty Appointments
Register were much more likely than white applicants to obtain
teaching jobs. Over twenty percent of the minority applicants
listed in the Register for the 1991-1992 academic year found
jobs, whereas fewer than thirteen percent of nonminority
applicants for the same period did.12 The su~cess of minority
applicants in the formal recruiting process during this period
was not offset, as one might suspect, by white applicants' greater
success outside of that process..."..in the so-called "old boys'
10. See, e.g.. Richard Delgado. Rodrigo'$ Chronide, 101 YALE 1..J. 1357, 1369-78 (1992)
(advocating the substitution of diversity for merit as a criterion in law school faCUlty
hiring); see also Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case fOT Ajfirmative Action in Legal
Academia, 1990 DUKELJ. 705 (1990) (advocating affirmative action in lawschools).
11. See Richard A. 'White, 77ze Gender and Minority Camposition ofNew Law Teachers and
MLSF~Appointments Register Candidates. 44J. LEGAL EnUC. 1424, 425 (1994). White
also notes that minority applicants have been even more successful in securing assistant
and associate professorships. See id. at 426.
12. See id. at 429, tbl.4. Minorities were more successful than nonminorities in being
recruited offofthe Register in the preceding and following years. as well. See id.
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network." In fact, the percentage of successful minority
applicants hired outside the formal AALS recruiting process was
greater than the percentage of successful nonminority
applicants.1s
This evidence of the success of minority applicants in finding
jobs teaching law does not, of course, demonstrate that the
critical race theorists like Richard Delgado are wrong when they
assert that there is widespread raciSm in society or that hiring
quotas may be a desirable remedy for it. The evidence does
suggest, however, that law school faculties may not be biased
against minorities in hiring new law teachers and thus that the
arguments often deployed by critical race theorists to support
quotas may not be credibly deployed in ~is particular area. The
advantage of a social science theory about merit and hiring
practices as opposed to a critical race theory about the same
thing is that the former does not invite dubious and hence
potentially counterproductive generalizations from one area of
employment to another. In general, the more precise focus of
well-articulated theories in law and social sciences renders them
more tenable and persuasive than theories from other "law-
ands" exactly because these social science theories have an
explicit relevance to the areas to which their proponents seek to
apply them.
Regardless of your political agenda, if you "want to lead a
richer intellectual life, understand the genesis and effects of
legal rules, and persuade others to support legal interpretations
or reforms, relying on economics or some other social science
methodology is a good way to go. Naturally, law and
economics-like other law and social sciences-has its
detractors. For example, Tony Kronman, the Dean of Yale Law
School, has written a book about the legal profession in which
he explicitly argues that the ascendancy of law and economics
has contributed to pathological conditions in current legal
education and practice.14 Kronman's argument, however, does
not attack the proposition that law and social sciences are
uniquely useful and instructive approaches among the panoply
of modern "law-ands." Instead, Kronman's argument seems to
13. See ill. at 433.
14. SeeKRONMAN, supra note 3, at 225-381.
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emphasize that no single interdisciplinary approach can be
appropriate for every analysis of the law. We might formulate
the best normative view of the role of the lawyer ifwe considered
philosophy extensively and disregarded economics entirely. I
gladly concede this possibility. It is exactly because law and
economics is not the best approach for every field of inquiry that
I have argued that the qualitative distinction among "law-ands"
must not simply track the arbitrary lines between various social
science disciplines. Law and economics is not better than law
and psychology simply because proponents of powerful theories
often align themselves within the law and economics movement.
We should question, rather than reinforce, the pervasiveness of
law and economics as the primary interdisciplinary approach~ to
the law. On this, Dean Kronman and I agree.
Although law and economics is not the best interdisciplinary
approach for every field of legal inquiry and thus may be
considered unduly pervasive, I have tried to argue that, for most
purposes of legal analysis, some form of law and social science
provides the best approach. The nature of the scientific method,
upon which each law-and-social-science theory is based, simply
ensures a qualitative advantage over other "Iaw-ands" for the
specific purpose of analyzing legal rules. Because they are
empirically disprovable, value-neutral, and factually relevant, the
well-articulated theories in law and social sciences are the most
persuasive and informative of the interdisciplinary approaches
to the law.
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